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ENFORCEMENT OF CERCLA AGAINST
INNOCENT OWNERS OF PROPERTY
Joel S. Moskowitz* and Scott R. Hoyt**
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1980, the allocation of $1.6 billion over a five year period for
hazardous waste cleanup seemed to be an impressive expression of national will, however fuzzy the economics which suggested the adequacy
of that amount. The informal dubbing of the Hazardous Substance Response Trust Fund' as the "Superfund" and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA)2
as the "Superfund Act" betrayed a confidence which was soon to wither.
In 1986, as the reauthorization of CERCLA is debated, no doubt
has been expressed that the Superfund should be increased to an amount
exceeding $5 billion, with some congressional recommendations exceeding twice that amount.' The inadequacy of these figures have become
apparent over the past five years as the financial dimensions of the hazardous waste problems have been revealed. The United States Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) 1983 estimate of federal funding
needs alone ranged up to $22.7 billion.4 The United States General Accounting Office has indicated the federal bill could reach $39.1 billion,
with the total cost, including state and responsible party costs, reaching
more than $70 billion.5 These estimates, however, were based on the
* Of Counsel, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Los Angeles, California. B.A. 1967, J.D.
1970, University of California, Los Angeles. From 1983 to 1985, Mr. Moskowitz was in
charge of the Toxic Substances Control Program for the State of California. From 1970 to
1983, he was a Deputy Attorney General for the State of California specializing in environmental law.
** Associate, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Los Angeles, California. B.A. 1977, California
State University, Fullerton, J.D. 1979, University of California, Hastings College of Law. Mr.
Hoyt specializes in insurance coverage litigation, including coverage issues arising out of environmental hazards.
1. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980
§ 221, 42 U.S.C. § 9631 (1982).
2. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657
(1982)).
3. Waldo & Griffiths, Beyond the House Funding and Right to Know Votes, 4 ENVTL.
FORUM 17, 17 (1986).
4. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CLEANING Up HAZARDOUS WASTES: AN OVER-

VIEW OF SUPERFUND REAUTHORIZATION ISSUES 17 (1985).
5. Id.
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cleanup of the 1200-2000 most dangerous inactive sites.' EPA's hazardous waste site inventory currently lists approximately 19,000 sites, and
EPA expects the list to grow to about 25,000 sites over the next several
years.7
While the breadth of the financial chasm is uncertain,8 its impressive
dimensions have not gone wholly unnoticed by the courts.9 The need to
bridge this chasm has weighed heavily on EPA, the Department of Justice and the states which, as detailed below, have been urging ever expanding theories of liability on the courts. It is the thesis of this Article
that expressions of judicial sympathy with public need and good motivations have stretched the hazy language of CERCLA past the breaking
point. In the process, the courts have disregarded traditional notions of
fairness in forcing those admittedly innocent of any polluting activities to
pay for extravagant cleanup costs.
II.

CERCLA AND THE "POLLUTER PAYS" PRINCIPLE

In constructing CERCLA, Congress clearly intended to meet the
costs of cleanup with the stretched, but still recognizable application of
the "polluter pays" principle.' ° The Superfund itself is primarily funded
by industry fees in the form of taxes on chemicals." To fully fund the
cleanup bill, "Congress intended to have the chemical industry, past and
present, pay for the costs of cleaning up inactive hazardous waste
sites." 2 "Congress rationally considered the imposition of liability for
the effects of past disposal practices as a means to spread the costs of the
cleanup on those who createdandprofitedfrom the waste disposal-generators, transporters, and disposal site owners/operators."' 3 In United
States v. Price (Price11), 4 the court stated the legislative aims of CER6. H.R. REP. No. 96-1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 18, reprintedin 1980 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 6119, 6120.

7. Habicht, EncouragingSettlements Under Superfund, 1 NAT. RESOURCES & ENv'T,
Fall 1985, at 3.
8. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OmcE, supra note 4, at 17.
9. See, e.g., United States v. Price, 577 F. Supp. 1103, 1112 n.8 (D.N.J. 1983) (Price 11)
("While CERCLA seems to encourage swift government action, it allots only $1.6 billion dollars to the Superfund. Even the lowest estimates regarding clean up costs exceed that figure by
almost 5 billion dollars. .. ").
10. This tenet, formally adopted in Europe prior to the enactment of CERCLA, is sometimes honored there, as here, in the breach. Moskowitz, Hazardous Waste Management in
West Germany: An Identification of Issues, 3 ENVTL. FORUM 20, 24 n.16 (1984).
11. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 4611, 4661 (1982).
12. United States v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 840 (W.D. Mo.
1984) (citing 126 CONG. REC. S14,962-63, (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980)).
13. Id. at 841 (emphasis added).
14. 577 F. Supp. 1103 (D.NJ. 1983).
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CLA included "goals such as cost-spreading and assurance that responsible parties bear their cost of the clean up." 5
A.

Those Expressly Liable under CERCLA

To reimburse the Superfund for costs expended in cleanup and provide a means of direct action against responsible parties to force them to
clean up or pay for the cleanup of hazardous waste sites, Congress provided for abatement actions and actions to recoup cleanup costs incurred
by the federal or state governments, or by others. Section 106 of CERCLA provides that the United States Attorney General may bring an
action in the federal district court in the district where a hazardous waste
threat occurs in order to abate such a danger or threat. 6 Section 107 sets
forth four categories of persons who may be sued for cleanup costs by the
federal or state government or any other person who incurred cleanup
costs consistent with CERCLA's mandates. 7 Those persons who may
be liable include:
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel (otherwise subject
to the jurisdiction of the United States) or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or operated any facility at which such
hazardous substances were disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise
arranged for disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or treatment, of hazardous
substances owned or possessed by such person, by any other
party or entity, at any facility owned or operated by another
party or entity and containing such hazardous substances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous
substances for transport to disposal or treatment facilities or
sites selected by such person, from which there is a release, or a
threatened release which causes the incurrence of response
15. Id. at 1114 (citing H.R. RP. No. 96-1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 17, reprintedin 1980
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6119). See also J.V. Peters & Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 584 F.
Supp. 1005, 1008 (N.D. Ohio 1984) ("parties responsible for the hazardous release" held subject to liability for cleanup costs under CERCLA), aff'd, 767 F.2d 263 (6th Cir. 1985); United
States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1112 (D. Minn. 1982) ("Congress
intended that those responsible for problems caused by the disposal of chemical poisons bear
the costs and responsibility for remedying the harmful conditions they created." (emphasis
added)).
16. CERCLA § 106(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (1982).
17. Id. § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).

1174

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

costs, of a hazardous substance, shall be liable ...
B.

[Vol. 19:1171

."

Those Expressly Exempted from Liability under CERCLA

Congress clearly intended to exempt from CERCLA liability those
having nothing to do with creating, contributing to or knowingly maintaining a hazardous waste condition. This intent is manifest in provisions exempting holders of security interests, 19 and those who can show
the hazard was created solely by the acts or omissions of others. 20
Section 101(20)(A) of CERCLA defines "owner or operator" to exclude those "who, without participating in the management of a vessel or
facility, holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect his security interest in the vessel or facility ....
1
Section 107(b) provides that a person may avoid liability under section 107 by showing the release or threat of release of hazardous substances was caused solely by
an act or omission of a third party other than an employee or
agent of the defendant, or than one whose act or omission occurs in connection with a contractual relationship, existing directly or indirectly, with the defendant . . . if the defendant
establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that (a) he exercised due care with respect to the hazardous substance concerned, taking into consideration the characteristics of such
hazardous substance, in light of all relevant facts and circumstances, and (b) he took precautions against foreseeable acts or
omissions of any such third party and the consequences that
could foreseeably result from such acts or omissions ....22
The exemption and defense set forth above, if literally enforced,
would further Congress' intent to place liability under CERCLA only on
those responsible for creating or profiting from a hazardous condition.
C. JudicialElimination of the Requirements of
Negligence and Causation
Motivated by a desire to provide a broad financial base for cleaning
up inactive waste sites, courts have extended liability beyond that envisioned by Congress. This extension of liability is a direct result of omis18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id.
Id. § 101(20)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A).
Id. § 107(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b).
Id. § 101(20)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A).
Id. § 107(b)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3).
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sions from and ambiguities in CERCLA itself. That CERCLA presents
a Rorschach Test for judicial activities was noted in United States v.
NortheasternPharmaceutical& Chemical Co.,3 where the court stated:
CERCLA, although nicknamed "the Superfund," is not
the ultimate tool in dealing with the problems associated with
inactive or abandoned hazardous waste sites as initially intended by its sponsors. CERCLA is in fact a hastily drawn
piece of compromise legislation, marred by vague terminology
and deleted provisions. . . . [N]umerous important features
were deleted during the closing hours of the Congressional session [citations omitted]. The courts are once again placed in
the undesirable and onerous position of construing inadequately drawn legislation. z4
One of CERCLA's ambiguities is its failure to specify a standard of
liability for the categories of persons liable under section 106 (abatement
action) and section 107 (response costs reimbursement action). The original senate bill provided for strict liability but that provision was deleted
from the statute as it was enacted. Although section 107(a) now provides
merely that the categories of liable persons "shall be liable," the original
senate proposal provided that such persons "shall be jointly, strictly, and
severally liable."2 5 The courts have resolved the ambiguity of section
107(a), holding that CERCLA provides for strict liability.26 These
courts note that CERCLA section 101(32) states that "liable" or "liability" will be construed to be the standard of liability provided under section 1321 of Title 33, now part of the federal Clean Water Act. 27 They
reason that Congress intended a strict liability standard under CERCLA
because "[t]he courts have consistently construed § 1321 as a strict liabil28
ity provision."1
Traditionally, the imposition of strict liability required that the defendant caused the harm for which he is held liable.2 9 Congress' deletion
of the phrase "caused or contributed" from the compromise version of
23. 579 F. Supp. 823 (W.D. Mo. 1984).
24. Id. at 838 n.15.
25. S. 1480, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1980, reprinted in The Environmental Emergency Response Act: HearingBefore The Senate Comm. on Finance, at 5. See also United States v.
Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. at 843 (W.D. Mo. 1984).
26. See, eg., Northeastern,579 F. Supp. at 844; United States v. Price, 577 F. Supp. 1103,
1114 (D.N.J. 1983) (PriceII).
27. Clean Water Act § 311, 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (1982); CERCLA § 101(32), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601(32) (1982).
28. Northeastern, 579 F. Supp. at 844.
29. See Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 597-98, 607 P.2d 924, 928, 163 Cal.
Rptr. 132, 136 (1980).
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CERCLA created another ambiguity which courts have construed as imposing liability without regard to causation.3" Thus the door has been
judicially opened for holding innocent current and prior owners absolutely liable based solely on their status.
In New York v. Shore Realty Corp., the court noted that CERCLA
provides for a "causation defense" in section 107(b), which allows an
owner to rebut causation in conjunction with the imposition of strict liability and thereby avoid liability.31 Without citing legislative history or
other guidance, however, the Shore court arbitrarily concluded this defense is available only when third party acts or omissions creating the
hazard occurred during the ownership of the defendant relying on the
defense.3" This interpretation leaves the even more innocent successor
owners defenseless, an anomaly addressed in more detail below.
III.

SPECIAL APPLICATION OF THE "POLLUTER PAYS" PRINCIPLE

.4. Holders of Security Interests in Property
The holder of a security interest in property which becomes the subject of a CERCLA action is exempt from liability.33
Thus, a lender will have no liability under CERCLA regardless of
its knowledge of hazardous waste problems on property, so long as it
strictly limits its involvement to merely holding a security interest in the
property. Potential liability may arise, however, if the lender becomes
involved in the management of the property. Section 101(20)(A) of
CERCLA exempts those holding security interests only if they are not
"participating in the management" of the facility.34
In United States v. Mirabile,35 the court interpreted the exemption
for holders of security interests to preclude liability of certain secured
lenders. In that case, the federal government sued, among others, the
current owners of a hazardous waste site to recover costs incurred in
cleanup. The current owners, the Mirabiles, joined American Bank and
Trust Company (ABT) and Mellon Bank National Association (Mellon)
who had loaned money to business entities operating the site and took a
30. See, eg., New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1044 (2d Cir. 1985); United
States v. Cauffman, No. 83-6318, slip op. at 2-3 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 23, 1984).
31. Shore, 759 F.2d at 1044. See supra note 22 and accompanying text for a discussion of
CERCLA § 107(b)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3).
32. Shore, 759 F.2d at 1048.
33. CERCLA § 101(20)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1983). See supra notes 19 & 21 and
accompanying text for a discussion of this section.
34. Id.
35. CV No. 84-2280 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 6, 1985).
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security interest in the property. ABT and Mellon in turn counterclaimed against the Small Business Administration (SBA) for its financial
36
involvement with the business entities operating on the site.
During the 1970's, the site had been utilized by Arthur C. Mangels
Industries, Inc. (Mangels) for paint manufacturing. In 1973, ABT
loaned money to Mangels, secured in part by a mortgage on the site. In
1976, Turco Coatings, Inc. (Turco) acquired ninety-five percent of the
shares of stock in Mangels and continued to manufacture paint on the
site. In December 1980, Turco ceased operations on the site and one
month later, Turco filed for protection under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.3 7
In 1981, Turco's Chapter 11 petition was dismissed and ABT proceeded with foreclosure on the site. ABT was the highest bidder at the
sheriff's sale on August 21, 1982 and it informed the sheriff and tax department that it intended to take title. ABT thereafter secured the building on the site from vandalism, inquired about the cost of disposing of
various drums on the site and showed the site to prospective purchasers.
On December 15, 1981, ABT assigned its bid to the Mirabiles who accepted a sheriff's deed to the property.38
In 1976, Girard Bank, the predecessor of Mellon, entered into a financing agreement with Turco to advance capital secured by the inventory and assets of Turco. After Turco ceased operations, Girard took
possession of the inventory.3 9
In July 1979, the SBA loaned money to Turco secured by liens on its
inventory and equipment and by a second mortgage on the site. SBA
representatives visited the site three times during 1981 to monitor the
liquidation of Turco's assets.'
When they were brought into the case, ABT, SBA and Mellon
moved for summary judgment. The motions were made primarily on the
basis that they were not "owners or operators" under CERCLA, but
rather were exempt as the holders of security interests who, if they participated at all, did so solely to protect their security interests. 4 '
ABT's motion for summary judgment was granted. The court held
that although ABT had obtained equitable title to the property by foreclosure, it had done so only in an effort to protect its security interest and
36. Id.
37. Id.

38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.

41. Id.

1178

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 19:1171

"made no effort to continue Turco's operations on the property."4 The
court held:
[T]he statutory exemption for secured creditors is particularly
applicable to ABT's limited activities at the property following
the foreclosure. The actions undertaken by ABT with respect
to the site simply cannot be deemed to constitute participation
in the management of the site .... [I]n enacting CERCLA
Congress manifested its intent to impose liability upon those
who were responsible for and profited from improper disposal
practices. Thus, it would appear that before a secured creditor
such as ABT may be held liable, it must, at a minimum, participate in the day-to-day operationalaspects of the site. In the instant case, ABT merely foreclosed on the property after all
operations had ceased and thereafter took prudent and routine
steps to secure the property againstfurther depreciation.4"
The court also granted SBA's motion for summary judgment, holding that because the SBA never took either legal or equitable title, its case
for summary judgment was even stronger than ABT's. The court rejected arguments that SBA was liable because its loan agreement contemplated involvement in management, stating that "participation in purely
financial aspects of operation . . . is [not] sufficient to bring a lender
within the scope of CERCLA's liability."'
The court denied Mellon's motion for summary judgment, finding
that issues of fact were created by deposition testimony. This testimony
showed that certain loan officers at Mellon and its predecessor, Girard,
had been involved in the management of Turco by frequently visiting the
site, requesting manufacturing changes and generally discussing sales efforts. Although the court noted that the "reed upon which the Mirabiles
seek to impose liability on Mellon is slender indeed," it nevertheless held
that the questions of fact made it necessary to .deny Mellon's motion for
summary judgment.4 5
Under the Mirabile court's interpretation, a lender may avoid
"owner-operator" liability under CERCLA if it does not involve itself in
the daily management, operational or production affairs of the site at the
time a hazardous waste problem was created. If the lender forecloses, it
must do so only after the operations creating the problem have ceased, in
order to avoid liability. This interpretation seems consistent with con42.
43.
44.
45.

Id., slip op. at 7.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
Id., slip op. at 9.
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gressional intent, but certainly limits the advantage of foreclosing on income-producing property.
Because Congress has expressly exempted holders of security interests from CERCLA liability, it would seem repugnant to congressional
intent to hold such persons liable if they take steps to protect that interest
or to foreclose in order to satisfy the secured debt. Such an interpretation would emasculate the exemption-a lender would remain exempt
only if the debtor does not default. Debtors would be encouraged to
default under such an interpretation in order to pass on the cleanup
problem to the lender. Lenders would likely delay foreclosure beyond
prudent business practice.
In California, a lender cannot take other legal steps to collect a secured debt until after it exhausts the security by foreclosure.4 6 This is true
even if the security is valueless-as when cleanup costs exceed fair market value-at the time the security instrument is executed.4 7 The only
exception to this rule is where the security becomes valueless without
fault of the beneficiary after the security instrument is executed. 48 A
lender holding a security interest in property with a hazardous site on it
could take advantage of this exception. If the hazard and cleanup costs
render the property valueless, the lender could pursue a deficiency judgment against the debtor without foreclosing upon the property and becoming entangled with CERCLA cleanup responsibility.
There is a clear distinction between participation in the management
of the facility when the hazard is created and participation in the management or ownership to protect or foreclose upon a security interest
after the hazard has been created by others, as recognized by the
Mirabile court. This distinction is in accord with congressional intent to
place responsibility for cleanup upon those who created and profited
from the hazardous condition.4 9
In United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical& Chemical Co.,
the court held two individuals liable as "owner-operators" of a facility.
One individual had been vice president in charge of the plant generating
the toxic waste involved and was in charge of having it dumped. He was
also a major stockholder actively participating in the management of the
46. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 726 (West 1980). See Roseleaf Corp. v. Chierighino, 59 Cal.
2d 35, 378 P.2d 97, 27 Cal. Rptr. 873 (1963); 1 H. MILLER & M. STARR, CURRENT LAW OF
CALIFORNIA REAL ESTATE § 3:82, at 483 (1975).
47. See 1 H. MILLER & M. STARR, supra note

46, at 487.
48. See Republic Truck Sales Corp. v. Peak, 194 Cal. 492, 515, 229 P. 331, 340 (1924); 1
H. MILLER & M. STARR, supra note 46, at 488.
49. See supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
50. 579 F. Supp. 823 (W.D. Mo. 1984).
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company. In holding him liable, the court noted the following significant
factors: "[his] capacity to control the disposal of hazardous waste at the
... plant; the power to direct the negotiations concerning the disposal of
wastes at the Denney farm site; and the capacity to prevent and abate the
damage caused by the disposal of hazardous wastes at the Denney farm
51
site."
The other individual held liable as an owner-operator was the president of the company as well as a major stockholder. The court found he
had the capacity and general responsibility as president to control the disposal of hazardous waste at the.., plant; the power
to direct the negotiations concerning the disposal of wastes at
the Denney farm site; and the capacity to prevent and abate the
damage caused by the disposal of hazardous wastes at the Denney farm site. 2
The court found these individuals liable as owner-operators under
CERCLA, notwithstanding the exemption for an individual who " 'without participating in the management of a ... facility, holds indicia of
ownership primarily to protect his interest in the ... facility.' " The
court held:
The statute literally reads that a person who owns interest in a
facility and is actively participating in its management can be
held liable for the disposal of hazardous waste. Such a construction appears to be supported by the intent of Congress.
CERCLA promotes the timely cleanup of inactive hazardous
waste sites. It was designed to insure, so far as possible, that
the partiesresponsiblefor the creation of hazardouswaste sites be
liablefor the response costs in cleaning them up. Congress has
determined that the persons who bore the fruits of hazardous
54
waste disposal also bear the costs of cleaning it up.
The key fact relied upon by the Northeastern court in holding the
individuals liable was the individuals' active participation in the management of the facility as owner-operators. This showed the individuals had
the ability to control the disposalof wastes at the time the hazardoussituation was created. The court thus recognized a distinction between a person in this category and one who participates in the management or
ownership of a site after the creation of a hazard by others, solely to
protect a security interest or foreclose on it. This recognition accords
51. Id. at 849.
52. Id.

53. Id. at 848 (quoting CERCLA § 101(20)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A)).
54. Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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with the Mirabile court's interpretation and the congressional intent
cited in Northeastern: to make the "parties responsible for the creation of
waste sites be liable for the response costs in cleaning them
hazardous
55
up.,,
Lenders who participate in the management of sites during the time
a hazardouscondition is created in such daily business matters as production, sales or distribution, and thereby demonstrate an involvement with
or ability to control disposal practices, are not likely to be exempt from
CERCLA liability.
B.

Innocent PriorOwners

Section 107 of CERCLA provides only for the liability of current
owners and those who owned or operated any facility "at the time of
disposal of any hazardous substance." 5 6 Therefore, one who owned
property and sold it without any knowledge of a hazardous waste problem, without having created or contributed to a hazard on it, should be
able to avoid liability. Potential liability exists, however, in light of the
57
broad interpretation given by at least one court to the term "disposal.
"Disposal" is defined in CERCLA section 101(29) as having the
meaning provided in section 1004 of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA).5 8 "Disposal" is defined in that section as the:
[D]ischarge, deposit, injection, dumping, spilling, leaking, or
placing of any solid waste or hazardous waste into or on any
land or water so that such solid waste or hazardous waste or
any constituent thereof may enter the environment or be emitted into the air or discharged into any waters, including ground
waters. 59
In United States v. Price (Pricei),60 the court interpreted "disposal"
as used in RCRA to include the further leaking of contaminants placed
on the site by others.6 1 Therefore, one who owns and sells property without ever detecting or having reason to detect a hazardous waste problem
on it conceivably could still be held liable if contaminants placed there by
55. Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
56. CERCLA § 107(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) (1982).
57. United States v. Price, 523 F. Supp. 1055 (D.N.J. 1981), afid, 688 F.2d 204 (3d Cir.
1982) (Price 1). See infra notes 60-65 and accompanying text.

58. CERCLA § 101(29), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(29) (1982); RCRA § 1004, 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3)
(1982).
59. RCRA § 1004, 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3) (1982).
60. 523 F. Supp. 1055 (D.N.J. 1981), af#'d, 688 F.2d 204 (3d Cir. 1982).

61. Id. at 1071, 1073.
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others were leaking into the soil, groundwater or air during his
ownership.
Price I did not involve a truly innocent owner, however, and its
holding should be limited to the category of owner involved. In that
case, the federal government sued to establish the liability of current and
prior owners of a hazardous waste site. The current and prior owners
sought summary judgment. The prior owners had allowed the dumping
of hazardous waste on the site and the current owners were aware the
site was a landfill when they purchased it. The current owners acknowledged as part of the purchase agreement that the site was a landfill and
they assumed responsibility for it. The purchase price was substantially
lower than the value of the land would have been had it not been a landfill. Once the current owners learned of the toxic waste problem, they
took no steps to prevent continuing pollution. The current owners were
brokers, who, the court held, had a duty under New Jersey law to inquire
about conditions of the property affecting its value, given the facts set
forth above.62
Under the circumstances, the court denied the owners' motions for
summary judgment. As to the prior owners, the court held they contributed to the disposal of hazardous waste by not properly storing chemicals
when they allowed dumping and by failing to rectify the hazard they
63
were aware of.
The court held the current owners contributed to the disposal by
"their studied indifference to the hazardous condition that now exists."' 64
It stated that as sophisticated investors, the current owners had a duty to
discover the hazard when they purchased the property. 65
Price I therefore applies to owners who created a hazard, those who
are aware or should be aware of a hazard when they purchase, and those
who fail to take action to prevent further pollution when they are aware
of the problem. Price I's interpretation of what constitutes "disposal"
should be limited to such owners, especially as the term is used in
CERCLA.
"Disposal" was given a more reasonable interpretation in the context of CERCLA section 107(a)(2) 66 in CadillacFairview/California,Inc.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id. at 1058-59.
Id. at 1072.
Id. at 1073.
Id.
CERCLA § 107(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) (1982) (relating to prior owners).
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v. Dow Chemical Co.67 In Cadillac Fairview, the court granted a prior
owner's motion to dismiss, commenting that they did not appear to be
liable under section 107(a)(2). The court reasoned they did not own at
the time of "disposal" because they did not dump the toxins or otherwise
create the hazard during their ownership. The court suggested that to
hold such prior owners liable as disposers would require a strained interpretation of CERCLA.6 8
Congress made a distinction in CERCLA between the terms "disposal" and "release." The term "release" is used in setting forth the liability of those persons who accept hazardous substances for transport. 9
That term is defined in CERCLA section 101(22) as including "spilling,
leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or disposing into the environment ....
This definition includes several passive terms not included under the
previously discussed definition of "disposal," including "escaping" and
"leaching." The term "release" is not found within the description of
liability of prior owners in CERCLA. 71 Arguably, had Congress intended passive prior owners to be liable for the ongoing results-i.e., escaping or leaching-of prior owners' acts of disposal, it would have
utilized the term "release" in that subsection.
In New York v. Shore Realty Corp.,72 the court held CERCLA section 107(a)(2) to be more limited in scope than section 107(a)(1). The
court held that "[p]rior owners and operators are liable only if they
owned or operated the facility at the time of disposal of any hazardous
substance; this limitation does not apply to current owners."' 73 The
Shore court noted that subsection (a)(1) imposes strict liability on current
owners when there is "a release or threat of release, without regard to
causation."'74
The distinction between "release" and "disposal" appears significant
in the Shore court's analysis. If "disposal" is interpreted to include undetected leaking during an innocent prior owner's tenure, section 107(a)(2)
would not necessarily be more limited than section 107(a)(1). By concluding that subsection (a)(2) is more limited, the Shore court seemingly
67. 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1108, on reh'g, 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1584 (C.D. Cal.

1984).
68. Id. at 1114.
69. CERCLA § 107(a)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4) (1982).
70. Id. § 101(22), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22).
71. See id. § 107(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2).
72. 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985).
73. Id. at 1044 (footnote omitted).
74. Id.
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recognized that the term "disposal" connotes some involvement in the
creation of the hazard while the term "release" used in subsection (a)(1)
does not. Without such a distinction, the defense in section 107(b)(3) 75 is
virtually worthless. An innocent owner, held to have contributed to a
hazard simply because of undetected leaking during his ownership, could
not claim the hazard arose solely from the acts or omissions of others.
This defense should be available to innocent prior owners.
In United States v. Mirabile,7 6 the court rejected the government's
contention that a current owner who had not placed contaminants on the
property, or otherwise created the hazard, nevertheless could not escape
liability under section 107(b)(3) where the contaminants had continued
to leak during the current owner's tenure. The court stated that "a common sense reading of... the statute [CERCLA § 107(b)(3)] suggests that
the defense would be potentially available to a party who can establish
that he purchased property on which hazardous wastes were placed by
77
others and that he did not add to those wastes."
C. Liability of Innocent Present Owners
Although there are cases suggesting a present owner may be liable
without regard to causation or knowledge of the hazard, none of these
cases factually involved such an innocent owner.
New York v. Shore Realty Corp.78 involved an owner who was aware
of the hazardous waste problem in purchasing the property, who assumed the environmental liability of the previous owner pursuant to the
purchase agreement, and who was aware tenants on the property were
continuing to dump hazardous waste after he obtained title. 79 Presumably, the owner knowingly took advantage of the reduced purchase price
resulting from the hazardous waste problem. Such an owner assumed
the risk of any hazardous problem on the property, and comes within the
group of individuals Congress intended to hold liable for participating in
or profiting from activities creating the hazardous condition. 80
For a secured lender to be deemed to have assumed the risks associated with a hazardous waste problem so as to be liable upon foreclosing
as an "owner" under the Shore holding, the lender should have been
75. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
76. CV No. 84-2280 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 6, 1985); see supra notes 35-45 and accompanying text
for a discussion of Mirabile.
77. Id., slip op. at 13.
78. 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985).
79. Id. at 1048-49.
80. Id.
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aware of such problem when it made the decision to accept the property
as security. If the lender had the opportunity to value the security with
knowledge of its hazards, it can be said to have assumed the risk. Otherwise, even if the lender becomes aware of the hazard before foreclosure, it
does not truly assume the risk simply by foreclosing. At that point, foreclosure is necessary to mitigate the lender's loss on a loan made before
the lender's knowledge of the problem.
In City of Philadelphiav. Stepan Chemical Co.," the court suggested
in dicta that a city-owner of a waste site was absolutely liable without
regard to whether it caused or had knowledge of a hazard. In that case,
generators bribed city employees to allow toxic dumping during the
City's ownership of the site. The City sued those who generated and
dumped the waste to recover the costs of cleanup. The court implied
that the City was one of those responsible for cleanup as the owner of the
site, even though it was completely innocent of the activities creating the
problem. The court noted that the City would not be vicariously liable
for the criminal acts of its employees in accepting bribes to allow
82
dumping.
The city-owner in Stepan can still be distinguished from an innocent
owner who acquires the property after the problem was created. In Stepan, the means of controlling the problem were available to the cityowner and the problem was created during its ownership by its own employees. This distinction must have been significant to Congress because
the defense provided in section 107(b)(3) does not allow a defendant to
escape liability for a release if it results from an act or omission of an
employee or agent of the defendant. It excludes liability only for "an act
or omission of a third party other than an employee or agent of the
defendant. 83
The City in Stepan did not question the generators' contention that
the City was liable as an owner. However, the court commented that at
least one law review author "argued persuasively that where an entity
falls within the technical description of a responsible party but has little
or no connection with the creation of the hazardous condition, the imposition of CERCLA liability may be unwarranted."8 4
81. 544 F. Supp. 1135 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
82. Id. at 1141, 1142 n.8.
83. CERCLA § 107(b)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3) (1982) (emphasis added); see supra text
at note 22 for the relevant language of this section. See also supra notes 50-55 and accompanying text for a discussion of United States v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp.
823 (W.D. Mo. 1984). The Northeastern court held control at the time the hazard was created
to be significant. Id. at 874.
84. Stepan, 544 F. Supp. at 1143 n. 10 (citing Dore, The Standard of Civil Liability for
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United States v. Price (Price I)5 has already been distinguished

from an innocent owner context because it involved an owner who assumed the risk of the hazard and failed to prevent further pollution after
86
acquiring knowledge of the danger.
If the decisions discussed above are limited to the "knowing" owners or the owners not otherwise exempt under CERCLA section

107(b)(3) who were involved in those cases, they can be more easily reconciled with Congress' intent to hold those who created or profitedfrom

the hazard responsible.8 7 If, however, these decisions are applied to truly
innocent owners who neither created a hazard nor were aware of it when
acquiring the property, they are contrary to Congress' intent.

In any event, innocent owners should be able to rely upon the section 107(b)(3) defense without the arbitrary distinction made by the

Shore court between those who own the property when the hazard is
created and those who acquire it later.88 Owners in both situations
should be able to use the defense. 89
D. Innocent Owners' Indemnity from Third Parties
Courts have construed CERCLA to permit joint and several liability
between those responsible under the Act." Courts have also held that
contribution actions are authorized under CERCLA.9 1 Truly innocent
owners, however, should be entitled to full reimbursement or indemnity

from those responsible for the hazard. In contrast, contribution is obtained between those having comparativefault. 92 In NationalIndemnity
Co. v. United States, 93 the court stated:
Hazardous Waste DisposalActivity: Some Quirks of Superfund, 57 NoTRE DAME LAW. 260,
276 (1981)).
85. 523 F. Supp. 1055 (D.N.J. 1981), affd, 688 F.2d 204 (3d Cir. 1982).
86. See supra notes 60-65 and accompanying text.
87. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
88. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
89. See United States v. Mirabile, No. 84-2280 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 6, 1985) (current owner
who acquired title to site after operations creating the hazard (third party acts or omissions)
ceased, could rely upon the section 107(b)(3) defense).
90. See United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326, 1337 (E.D. Pa. 1983); United States v.
Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
91. See Colorado v. Asarco, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 1484, 1492 (D. Colo. 1985); Reilly Tar &
Chem. Corp. v. Burlington, 589 F. Supp. 275, 282 (D. Minn. 1984); United States v. Ward, 22
Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1239 (E.D.N.C. May 14, 1984); United States v. South Carolina Recycling & Disposal, Inc., 20 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1753, 1759-60 n.8 (D.S.C. Feb. 23, 1984);
United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 807 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
92. See, e.g., National Indem. Co. v. United States, 444 F. Supp. 1356 (C.D. Cal. 1977),
af'd, 602 F.2d 1326 (9th Cir. 1979).
93. Id.
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Indemnity, which imposes the entire loss on one of two or more
tortfeasors, is distinct from contribution, which distributes the
loss equally among joint judgment tortfeasors....
... Implied indemnity will lie where the facts show that
"two persons are responsible by law to an insured person, if one
is passively or impliedly negligent, he is entitled to shift the entire liability for the loss to the other party whose active negli' 94
gence was the proximate and immediate cause of the lOSS."
Courts in California, however, have held that strict liability is fault
which may be apportioned with the negligence of other tortfeasors.9 5
Whether this means that one who is strictly liable and thus at fault cannot shift the entire loss to negligent tortfeasors remains to be seen.
Although liability under CERCLA may not be shifted from one person to another by way of indemnity agreements, indemnity agreements
between parties to allocate liability between them are permitted. 96
Claims for implied indemnity have also been judicially recognized under
CERCLA. 97 However, an owner seeking implied indemnity from a prior
owner is not likely to be successful if the prior owner's involvement with
the site was also passive; that is, an owner that did not allow disposal
activities on site during his ownership. 98 If strict liability is considered
apportionable fault, 99 then, at the least, contribution may still be sought
between passive prior and current owners held strictly liable under
CERCLA.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Although some courts' interpretations of CERCLA open the door
to liability of innocent owners, their holdings on that point are dicta.
94. Id. at 1360.
95. See Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Nest-Kart, 21 Cal. 3d 322, 330, 579 P.2d 441, 445, 146 Cal.
Rptr. 550, 554 (1978).

96. CERCLA § 107(e)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(e)(1) (1982). Section 107(3)(1) provides as
follows:
No indemnification, hold harmless, or similar agreement or conveyance shall be effective to transfer from the owner or operator of any vessel or facility or from any
person who may be liable for a release or threat of release under this section, to any
other person the liability imposed under this section. Nothing in this subsection shall
bar any agreement to insure, hold harmless, or indemnify a party to such agreement
for any liability under this section.
Id. § 107(e)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(e)(1).
97. See Colorado v. Asarco, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 1484, 1492 (D. Colo. 1985).
98. See, e.g., Cadillac Fairview/California, Inc. v. Dow Chem. Co., 21 Env't Rep. Cas.
(BNA) 1108. For a discussion of CadillacFairview, see supra notes 67-71 and accompanying
text.
99. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
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Each case involved either "knowing" owners who purchased the site
aware of the hazardous waste problems, or owners not exempt under the
section 107(b)(3) defense. These cases should be followed only for the
proposition that such "knowing" owners are liable under CERCLA.
Congressional intent supports an interpretation of CERCLA that exempts innocent owners from liability under the Act.

